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ABSTRACT
Background
Since 1998 the serious public health problem in South East Asia of counterfeit artesunate,
containing no or subtherapeutic amounts of the active antimalarial ingredient, has led to
deaths from untreated malaria, reduced confidence in this vital drug, large economic losses for
the legitimate manufacturers, and concerns that artemisinin resistance might be engendered.
Methods and Findings
With evidence of a deteriorating situation, a group of police, criminal analysts, chemists,
palynologists, and health workers collaborated to determine the source of these counterfeits
under the auspices of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the
Western Pacific World Health Organization Regional Office. A total of 391 samples of genuine
and counterfeit artesunate collected in Vietnam (75), Cambodia (48), Lao PDR (115), Myanmar
(Burma) (137) and the Thai/Myanmar border (16), were available for analysis. Sixteen different
fake hologram types were identified. High-performance liquid chromatography and/or mass
spectrometry confirmed that all specimens thought to be counterfeit (195/391, 49.9%) on the
basis of packaging contained no or small quantities of artesunate (up to 12 mg per tablet as
opposed to ; 50 mg per genuine tablet). Chemical analysis demonstrated a wide diversity of
wrong active ingredients, including banned pharmaceuticals, such as metamizole, and safrole,
a carcinogen, and raw material for manufacture of methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(‘ecstasy’). Evidence from chemical, mineralogical, biological, and packaging analysis suggested
that at least some of the counterfeits were manufactured in southeast People’s Republic of
China. This evidence prompted the Chinese Government to act quickly against the criminal
traders with arrests and seizures.
Conclusions
An international multi-disciplinary group obtained evidence that some of the counterfeit
artesunate was manufactured in China, and this prompted a criminal investigation. Interna-
tional cross-disciplinary collaborations may be appropriate in the investigation of other serious
counterfeit medicine public health problems elsewhere, but strengthening of international
collaborations and forensic and drug regulatory authority capacity will be required.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Malaria still claims over one million lives each year and is a
risk for some 40% of the world’s population [1,2]. Most
patients with malaria would survive if they had timely access
to efﬁcacious medicines that they could afford. With the
global spread of drug resistance and the practical difﬁculties
in delivering health care to rural communities, most of those
at risk of malaria have not had such access [3]. However, with
the development of artemisinin derivative combination
therapy (ACT) and international ﬁnancial support to allow
inexpensive or free distribution to those in need, hope of
controlling malaria has been rekindled [3]. A major obstacle
to malaria control, which has received woefully insigniﬁcant
attention in the past, is the poor quality of antimalarial
medicines available in much of the tropics. The available data
strongly suggest that antimalarials have been particularly
targeted by counterfeiters, who have deliberately and
fraudulently produced copies for proﬁt, usually containing
no active ingredients and therefore lacking antimalarial
activity [4].
Artesunate is an antimalarial artemisinin derivative,
developed in the People’s Republic of China (China), vital
for malaria treatment [5]. It is widely used in South East (SE)
Asia and increasingly in Africa for the treatment of
Plasmodium falciparum malaria [3]. In SE and East Asia there
are at least 16 manufacturers of artemisinin and its
derivatives [6] and millions of tablets are produced each year
both for consumption in Asia and export to Africa.
Artesunate is a crucial component of artemisinin deriva-
tive-based combination therapy, but is often used inappropri-
ately as monotherapy outside of national malaria
programmes.
Since 1998 an epidemic of multiple types of counterfeit
artesunate tablets, both primitive and highly sophisticated
copies, have affected patients with malaria in mainland SE
Asia (Figures 1, 2, and S1). Ad hoc surveys since 2000 in
Burma (Myanmar), the Thai/Myanmar border, the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR, Laos), Cambodia,
and Vietnam, the most malarious countries in mainland SE
Asia, suggested that 33%–53% of bought artesunate was
counterfeit, containing either no or subtherapeutic quanti-
ties of artesunate (Figure 1) [7–13]. In Thailand, which has
only a small number of malaria cases, the threat of counter-
feit artesunate has been largely averted: such counterfeits
have only been described from the central Thai/Myanmar
border area around the Western border town of Mae Sot.
Counterfeit artesunate has been recently described from
southern China [14]. In Asia the product of one major
producer of artesunate, Guilin Pharmaceutical (Guilin,
Guangxi autonomous region, China), has been exclusively
targeted. The recent description of counterfeit artemisinin
derivatives in four sub-Saharan African countries is of
enormous public health concern [10,15–17].
Counterfeit artesunate containing subtherapeutic quanti-
ties of artesunate has recently been described in Asia [10].
Such counterfeits, which may foil simple screening tests, will
engender the selection and spread of artemisinin resistant
falciparum parasites, which would be disastrous for malaria
control in Asia and thereafter in Africa.
Despite the difﬁculties of demonstrating in rural Asia that
patients die of malaria because of fake drugs, such mortality
has been reported [10]. Malaria remains a public health
problem in the countries affected by fake artesunate—with
estimates of over 2 million cases/year and over 10,000 deaths/
year in the Western Paciﬁc Region of the World Health
Organization (2001 data [18]). With an estimated prevalence
of counterfeit artesunate of 33%–53% in mainland SE Asia
and a high proportion of patients obtaining antimalarials
outside the public health provision of ACTs, the health
impact on malaria morbidity and mortality must be consid-
erable—but extremely difﬁcult to quantify.
Since the ﬁrst description of fake artesunate in 2000, there
has been little action in comparison to its public health
consequences, apart from surveys [8–13], warnings and
educational ﬁlms [10, 19] with some strengthening of drug
regulatory authority (DRA) and malaria programme capacity.
With little progress and worsening contamination of the
supply of antimalarials in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region, a
conﬁdential meeting was held in Manila in May 2005 at the
WHO Regional Ofﬁce for the Western Paciﬁc (WPRO). The
meeting brought together WHO ofﬁcials, physicians, phar-
macists, and scientists working in the region with the
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to
discuss what could be done. It was decided that a joint effort
be made to investigate where the counterfeits were being
manufactured and develop an intelligence document that
could be presented to concerned governments with a request
that measures be taken to stop the lethal manufacture and
trade in counterfeit artesunate.
In the hope that forensic analysis of genuine and counter-
feit tablets would provide clues as to the origin of the
counterfeits, samples were subjected to high performance
liquid chromatography (HPLC), organic mass spectrometry,
X-ray diffraction, stable isotope ratio mass spectrometry, gas-
chromatographic ‘head space’ analysis of the gases surround-
ing tablets in blister packs, pollen analysis (palynology), and
detailed packaging inspection. Further meetings were held in
Oxford, UK, and Manila to review the evidence under the
umbrella of the Jupiter Operation INTERPOL anti-counter-
feiting taskforce chaired by JN. This paper presents the
ﬁndings of this group relevant to public health.
Methods
Samples
391 samples of genuine and counterfeit artesunate col-
lected in Vietnam (75), Cambodia (48), Lao PDR (115),
Myanmar (Burma) (137) and the Thai/Myanmar border (16),
during 1999–2006 by the Wellcome Trust-Oxford SE Asian
Tropical Medicine Research Programme, underwent Fast Red
TR Dye testing [20] and/or HPLC and mass spectrometry and
analysis of packaging. These samples were collected and
analysed as a part of formal surveys using convenience
sampling [8,9,11] and random sampling (in Laos only,
unpublished data) and ad hoc at the request of individuals
and non-governmental organisations in the region.
A subset of 27 fakes from this collection and ﬁve genuine
packets, along with four fake (collected in Cambodia) and two
genuine samples from the United States Pharmacopeia (USP)
Drug Quality and Information Program, representing a
sample of the oral artesunate labelled as made by Guilin
Pharmaceutical available in 2005, also underwent detailed
forensic chemical and botanical examination as part of the
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described before [8–11,13,21–24], for the 391 samples and for
the 49 samples, including 11 seizure samples (see Action and
Examination of Seizures), subjected to detailed analysis are
presented and compared here.
Five samples seized by the subsequent Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) investigation in China were also analysed. All
laboratories performed the analyses blinded to the results
from other laboratories.
Physical Appearance
The physical appearance and text on packets, leaﬂet
inserts, and blister packs were examined and compared with
known genuine samples. Packets, leaﬂets, and blister packs
were examined with a 36 hand lens, 3100 stereo microscope,
and a hand-held UV (375 nm) light source and then
electronically scanned. Batch numbers, dates of expiration
and manufacture, the colour, clarity, and text of printing on
the blister pack, packet, and leaﬂet (when present) were
Figure 1. Map of the Distribution of Fake Artesunate, Collected by Wellcome Trust-University of Oxford SE Asian Tropical Medicine Research
Programme and Collaborators, in Relation to Packaging Type
Map drawn by Mr. Chongkham Phonekeo.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050032.g001
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which batch numbers were genuine for samples labelled as
manufactured by this company.
Chemical Investigations
Tablets were processed and analyzed for artesunate
according to a modiﬁed HPLC method [25] (Protocol S1).
Samples were screened by two different direct ionization
mass spectrometry methods: Direct Analysis in real Time
(DART) [21] and Desorption Electrospray Ionization (DESI)
[22]. For validation purposes, DESI was performed in two
modes: reagentless DESI and reactive DESI. Three mass
spectra were thus provided for each sample (Protocol S2). A
small portion of each sample was analysed by X-ray
diffractometry (XRD; X’Pert Pro X-ray diffractometer,
Philips, Almelo) and isotope ratio analysis to determine the
mineral composition (Protocol S3) [26,27].
Biological Investigations
Tablet samples were processed (Protocol S4) and slides
examined at a magniﬁcation of 3125–250 for about 1 h per
slide. Any suspected pollen grains were examined and
identiﬁed at a magniﬁcation of 3500–1,000 by comparison
with reference material and compared with the known
distribution of the taxa found (GNS Science reference
modern spore and pollen collection [28–32]). These results
should be interpreted with caution as the spore and pollen
content could be indicative of either the place of manufac-
ture, the source of the individual ingredients, or both, and be
inﬂuenced by their wide wind dispersal and seasonality.
Invertebrate remains and other organic materials embedded
in the tablets were also identiﬁed.
Intelligence
Associations between location and chemical, biological,
and packaging features were examined and geographical
distributions mapped. Statistical analysis was performed
using Stata v8. These results were presented to the Ministry
of Public Security, People’s Republic of China, who carried
out a conﬁdential criminal investigation to track the traders
and factories responsible for this illegal activity in collabo-
ration with the Government of Myanmar.
Results
Physical Appearance
A total of 14 different fake hologram types were identiﬁed,
between 1999 and May 2006, ranging from crude stickers to
highly sophisticated copies, complete with the legend ‘Guilin
Pharma’ in microscopic font below the illustrated river and
the Chinese registration code ‘X-529 visible under UV light
stamped on the hologram (Figure 2). A further two hologram
types were identiﬁed between June 2006 and February 2007,
after the presentation of the evidence to the Chinese
authorities (Figure S1). The outer rings of all counterfeit
holograms were composed of misaligned blocks. Many other
small differences between the counterfeit and genuine were
noted. There were printing errors in boxes, with misalign-
ment of letters and words, differences in font, and spelling
mistakes, such as the spelling of Tablet as ‘Tabtle’ on type 4
blister packs. The text on the blister pack was printed with
offset on genuine samples but by serigraphy (silkscreen) on all
seven fake samples examined (types 1, 4, 6, 9, and 10),
resulting in thicker ink deposit and poorly deﬁned text. All
genuine and counterfeit boxes had a bar code printed on the
reverse (6920108100058), which was successfully decoded with
a handheld bar code scanner for seven fake samples
examined. Until 2005 the golden foil and Myanmar Registra-
tion Number, characteristic of Guilin Pharmaceutical arte-
sunate exported to Myanmar (Burma), had not been used in
the fakes—but samples with both these features appeared in
2006 (type 14).
Hologram inspection demonstrated that the central image
of the genuine hologram was made in ‘2D–3D’ style from ﬂat
graphic line artwork [13]. Fake stickers such as type 2 were
made from diffractive ‘rainbow’ foil deeply etched to form an
image. The type 3 fake hologram is a simple 2D origination
comprised of two exposures of diffractive colour, one of
which is much brighter than the other. The type 4 fake
hologram is very similar in appearance to the genuine
Figure 2. Examples of Genuine and Counterfeit Holograms
(A) Genuine Guilin Pharmaceutical artesunate blister pack hologram.
(B) A type 2 sticker copy.
(C) A type 10 hologram copy with the fake ‘X-529 stamp as seen under
UV light.
(D) Type 15 hologram copy from the seized counterfeit artesunate from
the China/Myanmar border.
For a full description of the 16 types of fake packaging see Figure S1
(updated from [10]). Types 15 and 16 have been only recently described
and were not included in the pre-seizure analysis presented here.
Photographs by Paul Newton.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050032.g002
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niques, comprised of a 2D image in two contrasting colours.
Unlike the genuine hologram, both diffractive colours are
made using the McGrew method (with diffused object beams,
rather than undiffused gratings) and thus have higher
brightness than the genuine hologram. As in the genuine
hologram, the kinetic feature of the outer ring is formed of
sections in three different diffractive colours (two of which
are the same colours as the main image). In type 4 these
colours are repeated to provide an apparent animation when
the hologram is tilted vertically, rather than right-to-left as in
the genuine hologram [13].
Chemical Composition
HPLC, Fast Red Dye testing [20], and/or mass spectrometry
conﬁrmed that all specimens thought to be counterfeit (195/
391, 49.9%) on the basis of packaging contained no or small
quantities of artesunate (up to 12 mg per tablet as opposed to
; 50 mg per genuine tablet). One sample from Cambodia had
apparently genuine packaging but contained only 21 mg
artesunate and was therefore either substandard or had
deteriorated in transit and/or storage [13]. Of 321 samples
labelled as made by Guilin Pharmaceutical, 195 (61%) were
counterfeit. Of 51 artesunate counterfeits that underwent
mass spectrometry, a wide variety of unexpected ‘wrong’
pharmaceuticals were found, including paracetamol (n ¼ 24),
sulphadoxine (n ¼ 18), pyrimethamine (n ¼ 11), dimethylfu-
marate (n ¼ 17), erythromycin (n ¼ 8), erucamide (n ¼ 5),
safrole (n ¼ 6), artemisinin (n ¼ 10) metamizole (n ¼ 10), 2-
mercaptobenzothiazole (n ¼ 5), chloramphenicol (n ¼ 4),
metronidazole (n ¼ 2) and chloroquine (n ¼ 2). In addition,
four samples contained subtherapeutic amounts of artesu-
nate within fake packaging; (Tables S1 and S2) [7, 21]. A wide
variety of different erythromycins (erythromcin A–F and
anhydroerythromycin A, 20–191 mg/g tablet) have also been
described from fake artesunate with considerable inter-tablet
variation in those present [13]. In addition, three samples
collected in the USP Drug Quality and Information Program
in the Jupiter subset from Cambodia (types 3 and 10)
contained sulfamethoxazole (62, 66, and 0.06 mg/tablet) and
XRD demonstrated the presence of decanoic acid and
metamizole in a type 10 sample. Headspace analysis demon-
strated the presence of ethanol and chloroform in the gas
surrounding apparently genuine Guilin Pharmaceutical
artesunate tablets from four blister packs (chloroform 1–2
lg/g). Chloroform and benzene were found in the headspace
of a type 4 blister pack (chloroform 1 lg/g, benzene 1–14 lg/g)
and chloroform in a type 1 blister pack from the Thai/
Myanmar border.
XRD demonstrated great variability in tablet mineralogy.
Talc (hydrated magnesium silicate), calcite (calcium carbo-
nate), and starch were the main excipients detected. Maize
starch is the main excipient in the genuine Guilin Pharma-
ceutical product. Trace amounts of aragonite were present in
two calcite-dominated fake tablets and traces of chlorite
(iron-magnesium hydrosilicate) and quartz (silicon dioxide)
were found in a further two (Table S1). Stable isotope analysis
of the calcite fraction gave d
18O and d
13C values between
 11% to þ2% and þ2% to þ25%, respectively (where %
indicates parts per thousand) (Figure 3). Given the similar
isotope signatures the calcite in all (types 2, 4, 5, 8, and 11),
but one sample, appears to come from the same source and is
Figure 3. Plot of d
13C and d
18O Values, in %, of Carbonate in Tablets
Also plotted are approximate fields for values expected from calcite in different geological environments; igneous (red), metamorphosed (pink), and
unaltered limestone (green). Sample 05/17 is represented by the top right data point.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050032.g003
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is sample 05/17 (type 12) from southern Laos (Table S1)
which, if the calcite is assumed to have been formed by
natural geological processes, is typical of marine limestone
(Figures 1 and 3).
Biological Composition
Most of the spores and pollen recovered have a distinct
northern Asian temperate signature with evidence for plants
such as ﬁrs, pines, cypresses, sycamores, alders, wormwood,
willows, elms, wattles, and numerous fern spores present
(Figure 4; Table S1). The estimated origin of the samples
includes northernmost Vietnam and southern China, and
certainly northern SE Asia near the mountains bordering
Myanmar (Burma) through to northern Vietnam. Some of the
plant remains reﬂected the original plant source of the
starch. The presence of Juglandaceae pollen (Juglans [walnut],
Carya [wing nut], and Pterocarya [pecan nut or hickory]) in
some samples suggests manufacture in southern China. This
family is common throughout SE Asia but, except for the
north east coastal plains of China, dies out in southern China
north of the borders with Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam, and
Laos [33]. Three of the 11 samples containing calcite have
little or no spore/pollen contamination suggesting that the
contamination does not come from the calcite or its source.
In terms of the different types of fake hologram/sticker, type
2 appears different from the others with no smooth trilete
fern spores; type 1 contained little material but appears
similar to type 3; types 10, 11, and 12 had similar pollen
signatures. Types 5 and 8 did not contain anything to enable
comparisons and types 4, 6, 7, 9, 13, and 14 were not
examined.
Although we do not know whether the date of manufacture
stamped on the fakes is the actual date they were made, in
general the ﬂowering times of the plants whose pollen occur
in the samples agree with the date stamped on the blister
packs. The two exceptions are samples 2267 and 2/12051 with
a date stamp of September 2003. In addition to plant remains,
ﬁve samples contained invertebrates, including a Dermatopha-
goides mite nymph (from type 11, Vietnam, Figure 4E), which
is commonly found in house dust and has a global
distribution. All fake artesunate tablets contained charcoal
fragments, presumably from vehicle exhausts and ﬁres,
broken up by the processing for pollen. In some samples,
charcoal was so abundant that it suggested the source was an
area suffering severe air pollution.
Interpretation of the Evidence
The pooling of chemical, biological, and packaging
evidence suggests a wide diversity of fake artesunate in SE
Asia with strikingly different fake holograms and chemical
signatures. However, palynological evidence suggests that all
were produced in relatively temperate areas on the China/SE
Asia borders. Inspection of maps of the geographical
distribution of fake artesunate suggests that there may be
two different origins of counterfeit artesunate, with similar-
ities between the samples in Myanmar (Burma), the Thai/
Myanmar border and northern Laos in a westerly group and
similarities between those recovered in southern Laos,
Vietnam, and Cambodia in an easterly group (Figure 1). Of
Figure 4. Photomicrographs of Material Found in Fake Artesunate Tablets
(A) Debris, including charcoal fragments.
(B) Pinus pollen grain.
(C) Juglans pollen grain.
(D) Acacia pollen grain with charcoal deposit.
(E) Dermatophagoides mite nymph. The maximum distance across the abdomen is 116 lm.
Photographs by Dallas Mildenhall.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050032.g004
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with a detailed location recorded, there were a signiﬁcantly
higher proportion of counterfeit drugs in the east than in the
west (41% (62/151) versus 79% (133/168), p , 0. 001). In the
west 73% (37/51) of batch numbers used were invalid whereas
in the east only 1.5% (2/128) were invalid (v
2 ¼ 107.8, p ,
0.001). Classifying fake ‘holograms’ as either stickers or
holograms, fake holograms were afﬁxed to 73% (19/26) of
fake blister packs in the west but only 11% (13/120) in the east
(v
2 ¼ 48.4, p , 0.001). Fakes with stickers were only found in
Vietnam, Cambodia, and northern and southern Laos whilst
those with holograms were only found in Myanmar (Burma),
the Thai/Myanmar border, and both northern and southern
Laos. Samples collected in Cambodia and Vietnam bore fake
stickers and none with fake holograms was found in Vietnam.
The fake holograms all have mis-registration of the outer ring
and although mis-registrations differ between all types, they
have been made in the same way, suggesting the use of similar
technology and machines (D. Pizzanelli personal communi-
cation). Types 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, and 12 were only found in the east
whilst 6, 9, and 10 were only found in the west. 82% of type 1,
17% of type 4, and 25% of type 8 were found in the west.
With the exception of type 4, all those containing calcite bore
stickers and not fake holograms. However, the pollen
signatures of types 3, 11, and 12 (easterly) and 9 and 10
(westerly) were similar, suggesting that the manufacturing
sites of these two groups may be in the same areas of southern
China, but that they are separate operations with different
distribution networks. The upper case font error for ‘Mfg’
and ‘Exp’, found only on blister packs of types 8, 11, and 12,
suggests a link between the producers of these three types.
The occurrence of a type 10 blister pack in a type 4 box and a
type 13 blister pack in a type 9 box suggests links between the
producers and/or distributors of these fakes. These links are
consistent with the ‘easterly’ and ‘westerly’ distribution
hypothesis. The existence of two main sources is also
suggested by the chemical analysis. Metronidazole and
artesunate were only found in westerly group samples and
sulphadoxine, pyrimethamine, erythromycin, and erucamide
were found only in the easterly group samples. Dimethylfu-
marate (88%), 2-mercaptobenzothiazole (80%), metamizole
(70%), safrole (67%), paracetamol (67%), and artemisinin
(60%), were found predominantly in the east. Samples
containing chloramphenicol and chloroquine were found in
equal numbers in each geographical group.
The presence of numerous wrong active pharmaceutical
ingredients in counterfeits may provide clues as to their
origin(s). The observation that counterfeit artesunate (type
14) actually contained artesunate, but only on the surface,
suggests that the counterfeit tablets may have been contami-
nated with the genuine ingredient in a tablet press left over
from the manufacture of artesunate at an unknown location
[22]. The presence of sulphadoxine and pyrimethamine
suggests that the factory had been making or had access to
sulphadoxine–pyrimethamine, an antimalarial no longer
efﬁcacious in SE Asia. The discovery of safrole is of
considerable concern and interest as it is a precursor in the
synthesis of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA or
ecstasy) and is a banned ‘Table 1’ chemical in the United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafﬁc in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances [34]. Concerned that the
counterfeits may have been coming from the illicit meth-
amphetamine factories in Asia, we attempted to detect, but
failed to ﬁnd, methamphetamine or MDMA in or on the
counterfeits.
All the counterfeits analysed from Vietnam contain calcite.
The C and O stable isotope ratios of the calcite are consistent
with a geologically high temperature intrusive or volcanic
origin and not with a marine or terrestrial limestone or tap
water precipitation origin (except one, type 12). The presence
of a small amount of aragonite could indicate marine
limestone origin but heavy industrial crushing will convert
non-marine calcite to aragonite, which is also found in open
ﬁssures in volcanic rocks. High temperature hydrothermal
calcite is mined in an area west of Nanning (Guangxi
autonomous region, China) close to the Vietnam border
(Figure 1) [35] and the calcite used in types 2, 4, 5, 8, and 11
may have come from these mines.
The combination of excipient composition and palynology
therefore suggested that at least some of the counterfeit
artesunate were coming from southern China, close to the
border with Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar (Burma). Further-
more, the evidence suggests that there are at least two origins
of this ‘product’ with westerly origins via Myanmar (Burma)
and easterly origins via Vietnam trade routes with Laos in the
middle as an area of overlap afﬂicted by types of both groups.
In Figure 5 the types of fake hologram/sticker are plotted
versus the stated date of manufacture in the order they were
discovered in SE Asia. The ﬁrst fakes without stickers or
holograms (type 1) were labelled as made in 1996, whilst the
ﬁrst with fake stickers appearing in 1998 and the ﬁrst with
fake holograms in 2000. There has been a trend of increased
sophistication of the fake holograms but not of the fake
stickers. Some conﬁdential security features present on the
genuine were not copied on the counterfeits perhaps because
of the cost and difﬁculty of doing so or because the
counterfeiters were ignorant of their presence.
Action and Examination of Seizures
The evidence described here was presented, by the
Secretary General of INTERPOL (Mr Ronald K Noble) to
the Senior Representative of the Assistant Minister of Public
Security (MPS, Mr Zheng Shaodong), in March 2006 in
Beijing. The following issues were discussed in relation to the
evidence that the counterfeits were being produced in
southern China and distributed in large amounts into
adjacent malarious countries: (1) the enormous clinical
importance of artemisinin derivatives, which had been
discovered and developed in China, in the global treatment
and control of malaria; (2) the public health impact of
counterfeits in Asian and potentially African countries; and
(3) the economic consequences for Chinese producers, such
as Guilin Pharmaceutical, the main producer of genuine
artesunate—a WHO prequaliﬁed product.
In response the MPS carried out a criminal investigation
and arrested a native of Yunnan Province who, it was alleged,
had bought 240,000 blister packs of counterfeit artesunate
from a native of Guangdong Province, China who was also
arrested. 160,000 of these blister packs were alleged to have
been sold to a non-Chinese national on the Yunnan and
Myanmar (Burma) border, followed by a further 56,000 blister
packs at another border crossing on the Yunnan/Myanmar
border near Ruili whilst 24,000 blister packs were seized by
the MPS. The producer of counterfeits is thought to be a
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province. Those arrested await trial. During the approximate
period of this trade Guilin Pharmaceutical exported 272,000
blister packs to Myanmar (Burma) and Thailand. Therefore,
of the visible trade in 512,000 blister packs of artesunate, 47%
was in fake artesunate, consistent with previous estimates of
the proportion of fake artesunate in mainland SE Asian
shops.
Five samples of the seized counterfeit artesunate were
compared with six contemporary genuine samples from
Guilin Pharmaceutical. Of the counterfeit artesunate holo-
grams previously described from SE Asia those in this seizure
most closely resembled type 10 (Figures 2 and S1) but did not
have the ‘X-529 symbol visible on the hologram under UV
light on type 10. We have therefore described this as type 15.
Presumably this hologram has come from the same source as
type 10, but the X-52, which is stamped on the hologram
surface, was omitted. The pattern of ring blocks in the outer
circle in type 15 appears identical to that of type 10, which
has been described from northern Myanmar (Burma) and
northern Laos. The text ‘12 Tabs’ printed on the end tab of
the type 15 packet, had a terminal ‘.’ (i.e., ‘12 Tabs.’) on the
genuine packets but no terminal ‘.’ (i.e., ‘12 Tabs’) on the
counterfeits.
The median (range) concentration of artesunate in
contemporary genuine tablets analysed by HPLC was 48.4
(46.8–48.6) mg/tablet. The ﬁve counterfeit samples contained
artemisinin, and not artesunate, with a median (range)
concentration of 14.6 (14.1–15.1) mg (Table S1). As artemi-
sinin is considerably less active than artesunate, this very
small dose would have served only to encourage resistance,
and would not have cured malaria. No other active
pharmaceutical ingredients or calcite were detected in the
counterfeit tablets by mass spectrometry and XRD, respec-
tively. Palynology gave no evidence that the source of the
tablets is outside of southern China, but the types of pollen
and spores recovered are wide-spread types and do not
exclusively include southern China as the source area.
The seized samples were most clearly related to type 10
(and hence also type 4) in terms of packaging and were
related to the more sophisticated westerly counterfeits found
in Myanmar (Burma), Thai/Myanmar border, and Laos
bearing sophisticated holograms and without the plethora
of wrong active ingredients (other than artemisinin). The
absence of calcite in the seized counterfeits also supports the
hypothesis that these samples were produced by the group of
criminals involved in the putative western arm of the trade in
counterfeit artesunate distributing their product into Myan-
mar (Burma), down to the Thai/Burma border and across into
Laos through northern Myanmar (Burma) or southern China.
This leaves open the possibility that there is a second trade
route, which has not yet been disrupted, involving a different
group of criminals distributing and/or manufacturing fake
artesunate, with poor quality stickers and a variety of wrong
ingredients with calcite, into Vietnam, Cambodia, and
southern Laos. If this hypothesis is correct future examina-
tion of the prevalence of different types would be expected to
demonstrate a reduction in the westerly distribution, but not
that fed by the easterly trade route. We suggest that the
criminals responsible for the easterly trade route have also
manufactured or have links to manufacturers of sulphadox-
ine–pyrimethamine, erythromycin, and possibly to MDMA.
Discussion
The Jupiter group of scientists, criminal analysts, and
health workers was formed in an attempt to provide
information that could be used to control the epidemic of
counterfeit artesunate in SE Asia which had not been curbed
by pre-existing collaborations and institutions. The forensic
evidence suggested that at least some of the counterfeit
artesunate were coming from southern China, and that there
are at least two origins of this ‘product’—with westerly and
easterly origins and Laos in the middle as an area of overlap
afﬂicted by types of both groups. This evidence precipitated a
police investigation by the Chinese Government. Short-
comings of the evidence include that the artesunate
collections were ad hoc and not collected with a legal chain
of evidence and only a small subset of the collection could be
analysed due to ﬁnancial constraints. However, the samples
analysed did point to the apparent source of the fakes and it
is unlikely that a larger sample size would have changed the
outcome.
Further evidence was also obtained of the potential harm
of these criminal products, both to individual patients and
public health. A wide diversity of potentially dangerous
Figure 5. Relationship between the Stated Year of Manufacture of Fake Artesunate for Those Bearing Fake Stickers and Fake Holograms in Order of
Discovery between 2000 and 2006
Black, found in east and west; yellow, found in easterly distribution only; and blue, found in westerly distribution only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050032.g005
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artesunate tablets. The presence of unexpected pharmaceut-
icals, such as chloramphenicol and metamizole, may lead to
inexplicable clinical syndromes such as bone marrow failure.
Metamizole is banned in the European Union for this reason.
Benzene and safrole are Class 1 and 2B carcinogens,
respectively [36]. In addition, the use of ‘artesunate’ contain-
ing subtherapeutic quantities of artesunate, artemisinin, and
sulphonamides greatly increases the risk of the emergence
and spread of drug-resistant malaria parasites. A wide variety
of bacterial illness can be confused clinically with malaria and
the inadvertent use of subtherapeutic concentrations of
antibiotics such as erythromycin, chloramphenicol, and
metronidazole for such bacterial infections could also
engender the spread of antibiotic resistant bacteria.
Although there is a relationship between packaging and
chemistry this is not absolute, presumably in part because the
criminals change their recipes depending on what chemicals
they have available, out of synchrony with changes in
packaging. As there are few distinguishing external features
it is likely that type 1 has multiple sources and that we have
wrongly ‘lumped’ these together as is suggested by their
variable chemical composition [13]. Why so many different
pharmaceuticals are present is unclear but may simply be the
powders available to the counterfeiters. However, some
wrong ingredients, such as chloroquine (which is not efﬁca-
cious against falciparum malaria in Asia), may have been
added to give a bitter taste as there is a tradition in Asia that
antimalarials should be bitter. Furthermore, small quantities
of subtherapeutic artesunate may have been added to fool the
Fast Red Test for the rapid determination of authenticity
[20].
Forensic palynology has been used to determine the
location of murders [37–39] and the provenance of illicit
drugs [40] but, to our knowledge, it has not been used to
determine the location of the manufacture of counterfeit
pharmaceuticals or the origin of their ingredients before.
However, the results should be treated with some caution in
that the spore and pollen content could represent the place
of manufacture, the source of the individual ingredients, or
both, and some pollen types can travel large distances on the
wind. Most pollen identiﬁed were from plants whose natural
distributions are northern temperate or sub-tropical mon-
tane and not tropical types, consistent with a presumed
northernmost SE Asia source. Pollen from Artemisia was found
in two of six genuine and three of 18 counterfeit samples in
the Jupiter subset. It is possible that this pollen was derived
from the source plant for artemisinin, Artemisia annua, but the
pollen does not allow speciation. Isoetes species spores (found
in type 11) are endangered aquatic plants found in east and
SE Asia [41]. The presence of spores and pollen in the tablets
are more a reﬂection of source than ﬂowering times as these
palynomorphs have the ability to survive after dispersal for
over a year and can be picked up during the processing of the
tablets at any time of year. However, many of the tablets seem
to have been processed during or close to the ﬂowering
season of the plants identiﬁed. Those containing sparse
spores and pollen are not necessarily from different sources,
just evidence of a cleaner operation.
Outside of the large pharmaceutical companies there has
been little international collaboration between police and
those concerned with the public health problem of counter-
feit life-saving drugs. Large pharmaceutical companies are
active in investigating and facilitating prosecutions, but these
actions are rarely reported publicly and smaller companies in
the tropics do not have the resources to act. Such criminal
investigation and legal action is important in disrupting and
inhibiting the trade in counterfeit medicines. For example,
cooperation between the Belgian and Chinese authorities
resulted in the interception of 57,000 packs of counterfeit
halofantrine capsules en route from China to Nigeria and
arrests [42]. However, such forceful action needs to be part of
multiple linked tactics, including increasing the accessibility
of patients with malaria to inexpensive antimalarial drugs,
facilitating inspection by DRAs (30% of which have no
capacity or barely function [9]), and policing of the drug
supply.
Our investigation was able to make evidence-based
suggestions as to where at least some of the fake artesunate
was being manufactured. The involvement of INTERPOL was
crucial, acting as a bridge between the health sector
(including WHO and the physicians and scientists) and
national police agencies to act as a catalyst for action.
Indeed, once presented with this evidence the Chinese police
authorities acted quickly to stop production and dissemi-
nation. We suggest that this model of collaboration between
criminal investigators, forensic scientists, physicians, and
pharmacists is a useful approach in further combating this
scourge. The counterfeiters of anti-infectives have killed
patients with impunity. However, the use of new criminal
forensic tools may facilitate the detection of counterfeits and
greatly increase the risks to counterfeiters of being caught.
However, if this collaborative approach is to be used to
counter other counterfeit drug public health problems,
further investment in forensic analysis and the building of
sustainable links between relevant organisations will be
required. Police investigations of these trans-national crimes
without specialised evidence are unlikely to be successful.
Forensic evidence would allow overstretched police forces to
focus on these objective leads. There are very few laboratories
(only one in Asia/Paciﬁc) with the appropriate reference
collections and ability to analyse pollen assemblages in tablets
and the work is very labour intensive and specialised and
therefore expensive. Similarly, there are very few (less than
ten) public laboratories or research groups with the adequate
tools and human resources to perform detailed forensic
chemistry of fakes and the equipment required is expensive.
We were fortunate in that diverse international and national
bodies were able to provide their time and skill to try to solve
a single important problem.
The evidence available suggests that poor drug quality is a
major problem disabling public health in Africa [4,10,16,43].
If a collaborative forensic approach is to succeed, DRAs and
their international collaborations will need to be strength-
ened and regional laboratories able to provide actionable
evidence will be required.
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Samples judged to be counterfeit on the basis of packaging
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Table S2. Description of Different Types of Counterfeit Artesunate
According to Counterfeit Hologram Type for Whole Dataset
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Editors’ Summary
Background Malaria is one of the world’s largest public health problems,
causing around 500 million cases of illness and at least one million
deaths per year (the estimates vary widely). The most serious form of
malaria is caused by the parasite Plasmodium falciparum, which has
become resistant to multiple drugs that had previously been the
cornerstones of antimalarial regimens. One group of drugs for treating
malaria, the artemisinin therapies including artesunate, are based upon a
Chinese herb called qinghaosu; these have now become vital to the
treatment of P. falciparum malaria. But counterfeit artesunate, containing
none or too little (‘‘subtherapeutic levels’’) of the active ingredient, is a
growing problem especially in South and East Asia. Fake artesunate is
devastating for malaria control: it causes avoidable death, reduces
confidence in the drug, and takes away profit from legitimate
manufacturers. Of major concern also is the potential for subtherapeutic
counterfeit artesunate to fuel the parasite’s resistance to the artemisinin
group of drugs.
Previous estimates have suggested that between 33% and 53% of
artesunate tablets in mainland South East Asia are counterfeit. In this
paper the authors report on an unprecedented international collabora-
tion and criminal investigation that attempted to quantify and source
counterfeit artesunate among some of the most malarious countries in
Asia.
Why Was This Study Done? Previous reports have identified the
problem of fake artesunate, but as of yet there have been few reports on
the potential solutions. Concerned health workers and scientists, the
regional World Health Organization (WHO) office and the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) got together to discuss what
could be done in May 2005 when it became clear the counterfeit
artesunate situation was worsening in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region
of South East Asia (comprising Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yunnan Province in the
People’s Republic of China). Their subsequent investigation combined
the goals and methods of a range of concerned parties—police,
scientists, and health workers—to identify the source of counterfeit
artesunate in South East Asia and to supply the evidence to help arrest
and prosecute the perpetrators.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers conducted
forensic analyses of samples of genuine and counterfeit artesunate. They
selected these samples from larger surveys and investigations that had
been conducted in the region beginning in the year 2000. Genuine
samples were supplied by a manufacturer to provide a comparator. The
authors examined the physical appearance of the packages and
subjected the tablets to a wide range of chemical and biological tests
that allowed an analysis of the components contained in the tablets.
When comparing the collected packages and tablets against the genuine
samples, the researchers found considerable diversity of fake artesunate
in SE Asia. Sixteen different fake hologram types (the stickers contained
on packages meant to identify them as genuine) were found. Chemical
analysis revealed that all tablets thought to be fake contained no or very
small quantities of artesunate. Other ingredients found in the artesunate
counterfeit tablets included paracetamol, antibiotics, older antimalarial
drugs, and a range of minerals, and there were a variety of gases
surrounding the tablets inside the packaging. Biological analyses of
pollen grains inside the packaging suggested that the packages
originated in the parts of South East Asia along the Chinese border.
What Do these Findings Mean? The results were crucial in helping the
authorities establish the origin of the fake artesunate. For example, the
authors identified two regional clusters where the counterfeit tablets
appeared to be coming from, thus flagging a potential manufacturing
site or distribution network. The presence of wrong active pharmaceut-
ical ingredients (such as the older antimalarial drugs) suggested the
counterfeiters had access to a variety of active pharmaceutical
ingredients. The presence of safrole, a precursor to the illicit drug
ecstasy, suggested the counterfeits may be coming from factories that
manufacture ecstasy. And the identification of minerals indigenous to
certain regions also helped identify the counterfeits’ origin. The
researchers concluded that at least some of the counterfeit artesunate
was coming from southern China. The Secretary General of INTERPOL
presented the findings to the Chinese government, which then carried
out a criminal investigation and arrested individuals alleged to have
produced and distributed the counterfeit artesunate.
The collaboration between police, public health workers and scientists
on combating fake artesunate is unique, and provides a model for others
to follow. However, the authors note that substantial capacity in forensic
analysis and the infrastructure to support collaborations between these
different disciplines are needed.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0050032.
  The World Health Organization in 2006 created IMPACT—International
Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce—with the aim of
forging international collaboration to seek global solutions to this
global challenge and in raising awareness of the dangers of
counterfeit medical products. The task force membership includes
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, enforce-
ment agencies, pharmaceutical manufacturers’ associations, and drug
and regulatory authorities. IMPACT’s Web site notes that trade in
counterfeit medicines is widespread and affects both developed and
developing countries but is more prevalent in countries that have
weak drug regulatory systems, poor supply of basic medicines,
unregulated markets, high drug prices and/or significant price
differentials. IMPACT holds international conferences and maintains
a rapid alert system for counterfeit drugs.
  The drug industry’s anticounterfeit organization, Pharmaceutical
Security Institute, works to develop improved systems to identify
the extent of the counterfeiting problem and to assist in coordinating
international inquiries. Its membership includes 21 large pharmaceu-
tical companies.
  The Web site of David Pizzanelli, a world expert on security
holography, contains a PowerPoint presentation co-authored by Paul
Newton that illustrates the different types of fake holograms found on
fake artesunate packages, and their implications for artemisinin
resistance (http://www.pizzanelli.co.uk/content/artesunate.html).
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